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III.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff and Appellant Ratlin n Sohm ("Plaintiff) submits this brief in replv to
Dixie Eye Center. Ronald E. Snow. M.D.. and Jeffre)' R. Ricks. O.D. ("Defendants")

Appellees" brief. Defendants" arguments should be rejected, and the summar) judgment
dismissing Plaintiffs claims reversed, because the trial court based its decision on an

unraised and unbriefed issue which no part)' had the opporlunit) to address. As all

briefing below was regarding the issue of causation, and the trial court explicit1\ accepted
Plaintiffs position with regard to that issue but nevertheless granted summar\ judgment
to Defendants on the distinct and separate issue of damages, it's decision was in error.
Therefore. Plaintiff is entitled to relief from the trial court's adverse decision and its

Order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants must be reversed.
IV.

A.

ARGUMENT

The Trial Court Erred When it Granted Summary Judgment on the Issue of
Damages.

In their Motion for Summary Judgment below. Defendants' argument was clearlv
articulated. There, the) asserted that Plaintiff had failed to prove thai the cause ol'

Plaintiffs injuries could be attributed to Defendants. Specifically. Defendants argued
that "Plaintiffs medical expert... does not and cannot establish the element of causation

and was unable to state, within a reasonable degree of medical probability, what level of
vision plaintiff would have had if Defendants had given the eare he believes should have
been given." (R. 157) Throughout their motion. Defendants continued to araue that

causation could not be proven by Plaintiff, through arguments proffering that a jury

would be left to speculate on the issue, that there was no "basis in the evidence upon

which reasonable minds acting fairly thereon could believe with reasonable certainty that
Plaintiff suffered injury and damage and that il was proximately caused by the

negligence of the Defendant." and that Plaintiff had no expert testimony to "causally
link" Plaintiffs vision loss to Defendant (R. 169-170) emphasis added.
In response to Defendants" motion. Plaintiff limited her arguments to the issue of

causation, as it was the sole matter raised by Defendants. Defendants* Reply

Memorandum was also confined to the question of whether Plaintiff had sufficiently
established that Defendants' actions were the proximate cause of her injuries. As such,
all briefing before the trial court was exclusively related to the issue of causation, and it
was the only question before it for determination.

Inconsistent with the briefing, however, the trial court granted summary judgment
to Defendant based on Plaintiffs lack of proof of damages, a totally separate issue.
Although the court specifically recognized the distinction between the elements of

causation and damages in proving a negligence claim, it's opinion openly slated that,

"most ofthe parties* effort is spent on the proximate cause issue, but I find the damages

issue to be dispositive."1 Ruling on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, pages
Hoth parties also acknowledge the distinct elements ofa negligence claim, and separate
causation and damages into two different issues. Defendants cite Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional
Medical Center. 791 P.2d 193, 195 (Utah 1990) in listing the necessary elements, to include: "(3)
that the injury was proximately caused by the Defendant's negligence, and (4) that damages

1-2. Moreover, the court plain!) asserted that, with regard to causation. Plaintiffhad met
her burden lo overcome summary judgment, holding that there was "a sufficient issue

regarding proximate cause to prevent summary judgment." Li. at pane 2. Phus.
Detcndant's summary judgment motion was granted on the unbriclcd and unraised issue

ol damages, while causation was the onh issue the parties addressed.
Plainlilt did not ha\e the opportunit) to present her case on the issue of damages.
and is now entitled to thai pri\ilege. Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules oP Civil Procedure

governs the determination of motions for summary judgment and provides (in pari):
1he judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with aPlida\ its. if am. show that

there is no genuine issue as to an\ material fact and that the movirm part\ is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law . I '.R.C.P. 56(c).

Courts in other jurisdictions ha\c anal) zed identical provisions lo mandate thai "a parlv
seeking summar) judgment must spcctlicalh delineate the basis upon which summan
judgment is sought in order to allow the opposing party a meaningful opportunih to
respond." and that "the purpose of the rule |56(c)j is to ensure that a part) opposing a
motion tor summary judgment has a meaningful opportunih to respond to the motion."
Short v. Cclcslino. 1996 Wl. 339925. 3 (Ohio App. 6 Dist.). quoting Mitself v. Wheeler.
38 Ohio St.3d 112 (1988). lo (his end. courts have vehementlv held that, "it follows that

occurred as a result of Defendant's breach of dul\." (R. 168) Likewise. Plaintiff quotes
Stettensen v Smith \ Management ('orporution. 820 P.2d 482 (Utah App. 1W]) in saving that a
Plaintiff must prove both "that the breach of die dut> was the proximate cause of Plaintiffs
injur): and that there was in fact injure." (R. 348)

a trial court may not grant a summary judgment based upon an issue that was not
raised by either party." Id, emphasis added. {Hah courts have also followed this

reasoning. pio\ iding that "although Rule 56( I) permits relief on grounds not pleaded, that
rule does not go so far as to authorize the granting of relief on issues neither raised nor

tried." P'arr v. Prinkerho/J, 829 P.2d 117. I 19 (I hah App. 1992).
In this case. Defendants specifically delineated the issue at bar for the trial court.

limiting it to whether Plaintiff could prove proximate cause. Plaintiff responded
accordingly in addressing thai issue alone. She should not now be prejudiced by the trial
court's decision to grant summar\ judgment on a lolalh separate clement of neiJiiience.
which was never raised b) cither part), and which she never had a meaningful
opportunity to address.

1.

Plaintiff is Kulitlcd to Respond to tlie Newly Raised Issue of Dam ages
on Appeal.

Appellate courts generally do not consider an issue raised for the first time on

appeal. "In order to preserve an issue Por appeal, it must be raised in a limcK fashion.

must be specifically raised such that the issue is sufficiently raised to a le\el of

consciousness before the trial court, and must he supported by evidence or relevant legal
authority." State v. Kassuhn. 2005 WL 552K}5 (Utah App.2005). However, there are

also well-established exceptions that the Utah Court of Appeals has recognized to allow a
"new" issue to be set forth for the first time on appeal. Utah Medical Products, Inc. v.

Searcy. 958 P.2d 228. 234 (Utah 1998). Specifically, an appellate court mav address a

new issue if: (1) the trial court committed "plain error." or if (2) there are exceptional
circumstances present. State v. Archamheau. 820 P.2d 920. 922 (Utah App. 1991). As
both scenarios arc applicable here. Plaintiff should be allowed to respond to the damages
issue here.

Under the first exception. Utah courts have held that for an error to be plain, it
must be clear to the appellate court from an examination of the record (i.e. "it should have

been obvious to the trial court that it was committing error'"), and that the error be

harmful. Id. As noted above, in the case at bar. the issue of damages was never raised

bv either part). The trial court took it upon itselfto rule on a completelv separate and
unbriefed issue. The trial court record, and especiallv the court's opinion, leaves little

doubt as to this fact, and. as the authority above dictates, is an improper and obv ious
error. The trial court's ruling on an unraised issue is extremely harmful to Plaintiff. She
was unable to address the court's (not the Defendants') position, and now must relv on

appeal as her only recourse. The court's actions effectively terminated Plaintiffs ease,
and has prejudiced her in an egregious manner.

The trial court's actions also allow Plaintiff to address the issue of damages
pursuant to the second exception. The court in Archainbeau articulates this provision bycalling it a "catch-all device" requiring ""exceptional' or 'unusual*" circumstances. Id. at
922-923. "It is a safety device lo make certain that manifest injustice does not result from

the failure to consider an issue on appeal. Both the Utah Supreme Court and the Court of

Appeals have often acknowledged this exception." la. 1lere. Plaintiffwas unaware that

damages were at issue in her case and in Defendants' summary judgment motion.

Nevertheless, the court granted the motion on those grounds, while specifically stating
that Plaintiff had met her burden on causation. The fact that the trial court deviated from

the issue at hand and ruled on a complelel)' separate issue constitutes exceptional and
unusual circumstances that permit Plaintiff to address the new issue on appeal.
B.

The Authority Upon Which Defendants Rely is Inapplicable to the Issue
Before This Court and Provides no Basis for the Court to Rule in Defendants'
Favor.

In their appellate brief. Defendants continue lo -efuse to acknowledge the trial

court's actual holding, which, again, stales that Plaintiff has met her burden with regard
to causation. Instead. Defendants re-argue the causation issue, asserting that "because
Plaintiff could not establish a causal link between Defendants' care and her vision loss

and because any jury award in this medical malpractice action would necessarily be based
on speculation, the District Court properly granted summary judgment lo Defendants." R.
Defendants rely on several eases standing for this premise (none of which were addressed

in the court below). Defendants cite Anderson v. Nixon, 139 P.2d 216. 220 (Utah 1943)
which addresses the issue of proximate cause ("in this ease there was no evidence that

anything Dr. Nixon did or failed to do after osteomyelitis developed caused the end result.

In the absence ofsuch expert testimony, there is nothing upon which a jury can base its
finding on the proximate cause ofthe injury") (Brief ofAppellee, page 21). Talbot v. Dr.

W.H. Groves ' Latter-Day Saints Hospital, Inc. 440 P.2d 872. 873 (Utah 1968). which also
is an opinion on the issue of causation ("the Utah Supreme Court determined a medical

malpractice Plaintiff failed to meet his burden under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur

because he could not establish the cause ofhis injury and he left open the possibility of
non-negligent causes") (BriefoP Appellee, page 23). and Arnold v. Curtis. 846 P.2d 1307,

1310 (Utah 1993). ("the affidavit of | Plaintiff s expert | is devoid of any statement of
proximate cause and in no way counters or contradicts the opinion of (Defendant's
expert] that an earlier diagnosis of | Plaintiff s injury) would not have permitted earlier
treatment or surgery for that condition.") (Brief of Appellee, page 25).

Because these (and the rest of Defendants' cases), are irrelevant to this appeal, this
Court should decline to consider them. Instead, the Court should examine onlv those

issues left open by the Irial court through its opinion. Plaintiff is appealing from a

judgment against her based on the lack of proof ofdamages, and Defendants' rehashing
of the causation argument is not proper or necessary, particular!) in light of the trial

court's specific finding that material issues of fact precluded the entry" of summary
judgment on the issue of causation.

C.

The Tingey case is Properly Before This Court.

Defendants asserl that Tlngey v. Cluistensen. 987 P.2d 588 (Utah 1999). should

not be considered by the Court, maintaining that "Plaintiff has waived the right to argue
that Tlngey v. Christensen [citation omitted] applies to this case by failing to raise this

argument below." LN I 1, p. 30. Ilowever. the Tlngey ease was asserted on appeal in
support of the issue of damages, which, as has been established, was not at bar in the

court below. Plaintiff cites Tingey only for the proposition that if a jury is unable to

apportion damages between preexisting conditions and the defendant's negligence, the

tortfeasor is liable for the entire amount. Tingey does not speak lo causation in any
manner. Thus, pursuant to the authority above, and because this is Plaintiffs first and

only opportunity to address the damages issue, she should be allowed to utilize

supplemental evidence to rebut the trial court's ruling which has taken her by surprise and
prejudiced her case.

I.

The Facts and Rules of Law Set Forth in Tingey Are Dispositive of the
Issue on Appeal and Must be Considered by the Court.

Defendants also attempt lo distinguish the facts of Tingey from the instant case.
Defendants specifically offer that, unlike the situation here where Plaintiff suffers from

an ongoing condition, the Tingey plaintiff had only a preexisting injury, and that

somehow this difference is fatal to Plaintiffs case. However, Defendants' reading of
Tingey is inaccurate. There, the Plaintiff also suffered from an ongoing conditionchronic back pain. Tingey 987 P.2d at 589. 1he court explained her health in the
following manner:

Tingey was already in great pain before the 1993 accident. She had previously
been injured in several accidents: a February 1989 accident left short-lived

injuries, and an October 1990 accident caused severe neck and shoulder pain,
us well as headaches. She was also injured in two falls: one in 1991 and a

second in 1992. Twenty-five days before the 1993 accident, at the University

oPUlah Hospital Pain Clinic, she indicated pain in her head. neck, shoulders,

upper and lower back. amis, hands, and thigh. Tinge) described her pain then
as splitting, agonizing, pounding, torturing, constant, killing, and excruciating
id fherefore. the preexisting condition Prom which the plaintiff in 77//i,vi suffered
should be characterized as more of an ongoing ailment akin to Plaintiffs in the instant
mailer, than as one distinct previous injurv.

Defendants attempt to further distinguish Tingey from the case at hand b\
linking it to causation once again, although its facts center on the issue of damages.

Por example. Defendants quote a Tingey prov ision which provides that "once the fact
ol damage is established, 'a defendant should not escape liability because the amount
of damage cannot be proven with precision/" Tingey. 987 P.2d at 588. However.

Defendants then go on to assert that, because here. Plaintiff has not proven a causal
relationship, she also cannot prove damages. As previous!) mentioned, the trial court
has ahead) ruled that Plaintiff has proved causation, and causation is not the issue on

appeal. As such. Defendants" argument on this point is moot and should not be
considered.

Defendants" final argument with regard to the Tingey case is also fault).
Defendants provide that Tingey. an automobile action, should not be applied to
medical malpractice eases such as the one at bar. I lowever. Defendants cite no

authority for this proposition, simply saying that "well-established I'tab law" supports
then- position. In reality, the 'Tingey view of apportionment of damages was created bv

Utah courts based on several legal principles, none of which are limited lo a particular
type of negligence action. Tingey. 978 P.2d at 592. The first of these principles is
that a "tortfeasor takes a tort victim as he or she finds ;he victim." The second is that

"a tortfeasor should bear the burden of uncertainty in the amount of a tort victim's

damages." In staling this legal theoiy, the Tingey courl cites to Atkin Wright cv Miles
v. Mountain States Tel. And Tel Co.. 709 P.2d 330.33o (Utah 1985). which is a breach

of conlracfnegligent interference with business relationships case. The 77^'er court
also cites a breach oPlease agreement case {ll'lnsness v. M.J. ('onoco Distributing,

Inc.. 593 P.2d 1303. 1306 (Utah 1979) in demonstrating the final legal principle on
which they base their view of apportionment of damages, the fact that a defendant

should not escape liability because the amount of damage cannot be proved with

precision. Tingey. 978 P.2d at 592. Thus, il is clear that the courl designed the Tingey
standard for application to multiple tvpes ofnegligence claims, and that it is not sole!)
for use in automobile accident cases.

Additionally, the 77^'er proposition that a medical malpractice defendant is

liable for the entire amount of damages when ajury is unable to apportion them

between the defendants" negligence and a preexisting condition has been adopted in

other jurisdictions. For example. New Jersey courts have maintained that, especially
in medical malpractice actions, the burden of proof should be shifted to defendants

to apportion a plaintiffs injuries based on preexisting conditions. Tisdale v. Plelds.

443 A.2d 21 1. (N.J. Super 1982). In so doing, the Tisdale court directly contradicts
Defendants" policy position in holding that. "We think medical malpractice cases ci

in

be distinguished on the relatively light burden a treating physician is forced to
shoulder when required to apportion his patient's damage claims. The nature and
extent oPa patient's condition as well as his prognosis are peculiar]) within the ken of
the physician." Tisdale. 443 A.2d at 355. The Tisdale court also offered that "in the

usual malpractice case a physician is in a much better position with respect to the
proofs to express an opinion on causal relationship, and it is not an undue burden to

ask a doctor to negate the claim that the aggravation was due to his tortious acts." id.

Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that Tingey is applicable within the context of

medical malpractice claims in general and to the issue on appeal in particular and

should be considered by the Court. Finally. in light ofthe holding in Tingey. the trial
court's entry of summary judgment in this case was inappropriate and should be
reversed.

V.

CONCLUSION

The trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff s claim was based on an issue which was

never before the court. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant had an opportunity to address
it in their briefing. The trial court's decision was therefore erroneous, against case
law. and prejudicial to Plaintiff. "Phis being the case. Plaintiffshould now be able to

present her case on the issue that the court found to be dispositive, and the district

court's decision should be reversed.

Although il is the element of damages which is at issue on appeal. Defendants
continue lo direct this court's attention to arguments pertaining to the issue of

causation, which issue lias already been clearly and specifically determined by the trial
court in Plaintiffs favor. Defendants did not Hie a cross appeal on the causation
issue. Accordingly, they should not be allowed to reargue the causation issue before

this court. Defendants eile case after case in support of their motion for summary

judgment on the issue ofcausation, but completely ignore the issue that is actually
before this Court. Defendants also attempt to prevent Plaintiff from relying on Tingey
v. Chrlstensen. supra, because il was not raised in the court below. Again. Defendants
fail to recognize thai the issue before the trial court is totally distinct from that which
is now on appeal.

At a minimum, il is clear that there are issues of material Pact that preclude the

entry of summary judgment in Defendants' favor in this matter. Accordingly. Plaintiff
respectfully requests thai the trial court's decision be reversed
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